Introduction to the STRUCTURES Project
Security and quality of life in industrialized countries depend on the continuous and coordinated performance of a set of infra structures that can therefore be defined as critical. Examples of critical infrastructures include, amongst others, electrical energy distribution networks, communication networks, transportation networks such as railways, motorways and airways, law enforce ment structures and public health facilities. Their growing interde pendency increases even more their vulnerability to external attacks aimed at interrupting some of their services.
Hampering the functionality of such infrastructures using electro magnetic fields to jam, damage, or shut down the electric and elec tronic systems instrumental to their good performance has become a more and more effective threat in the recent years [1] , [2] . The tar gets could be very susceptible to such kinds of attack, as many of the critical infrastructures are civilian and protected by shielding which is neither designed nor tested to resist to high frequency and high power interference. On the other side, more portable and more powerful lEMI sources are becoming available, even "off the shelf".
These devices can generate various kinds of electromagnetic waves, from narrowband to wideband, from low frequency (e.g. a few kilo-hertz) to high frequency (e.g. a few giga-hertz).
In the past 25 years, the study of electromagnetic fields produced from high-altitude nuclear detonations (known as HEMP) advanced technical knowledge and brought forward good protec tion strategies [3] - [7] (see also Table 2 ).
The European Commission opened a call in the context of the overall FP7 Security Call SEC-2011.2.2-2 Protection of Critic al Infra structure (structures, platform and networks) against Electromag netic (High Po wer Micro wave (HPM)) Attacks, to investigate such threats. The diversity of structures to be considered, the intrinsic complexity of the electromagnetic phenomena, the plethora of existing (and foreseen) attacks, the numerous and different issues to be studied (modelling of the attacks, design of sensors, design of shielding, etc.) required a multi-disciplinary approach from highly skilled partners.
The project STRUCTURES started on the 1 July 2012 to address the call. The Consortium is composed of 13 partners, from five countries: 
Navigate Consortium
Its investigation is divided into three broad phases, described in Ta ble 1. The project faces many issues in the field of electromag netic compatibility, ranging from the problem of identifying refer ence configurations, taking into account all aspects relevant to electromagnetic modelling, to the problem of correctly modelling complex scenarios, composed of electrically large structures and many interacting elements, for a wide range of parameters. In the following sections, these points will be described in more detail. In particular, Section 2 presents a classification of IEMI threats; Sec- 
NEMP
Nuclear ElectroMagnetic Pulse; an electromagnetic pulse produced mainly from gamma rays from a nuclear explosion at any burst altitude, see [9] HEMP High altitude ElectroMagnetic Pulse; defined as a series of electromagnetic waveforms, covering times from nanoseconds to hundreds of seconds, that are generated from a nuclear detonation at altitudes above 30 km and propagate to the Earth surface, see [10] HPEM High Power ElectroMagnetic; defined as the general area of technology involved in producing intense electromagnetic radiated fields or conducted voltages and currents which have the capability to damage or upset electronic systems. Generally the disturbance exceeds those produced under normal conditions (e.g. 100 Vim and 100 V), see [7] tion 3 describes the different critical infrastructures considered in STRUCTURES; Section 4 gives an account of the methods used to deal with electromagnetic modelling of complex scenarios, emphasizing the use of the topological approach adopted by STRUCTURES.
attack stops the system functions as specified again. Another effect that can be realized with an electromagnetic attack is deception. The system can be spoofed by giving it false informa tion, e.g., transmitting a false GPS signal. Several studies have investigated the impact of IEMI on individual electronic systems [14] - [19] . The effectiveness of an electromagnetic attack is depen dent upon the victim susceptibility, the coupling path, and the electromagnetic weapon, i.e., the radio frequency (RF) source characteristics. The coupling path can be radiated or conducted and often the complete coupling path is a combination of both radiated and conducted. In this section we will focus on the RF source characteristics.
Threat Analysis of IEMI
The effect of an electromagnetic attack can be classified into four different classes: permanent damage, upset, interference, and deception. Classification schemes are described in [11] - [13] . The most severe effect is damage, where the system needs repair before it can function again. In the case of an upset, the system is As mentioned in the introduction, STRUCTURES focuses on HPEM temporarily disrupted, but not damaged. Interference degrades the environments. Figure 1 is adopted from [6] and helps to understand functioning of the system only during the attack, i.e., once the the relationship of the HPEM environment to other EM environ-ments, such as lightning and HEMP. See also Ta ble 2. The differ ence is that HPEM extends to higher frequencies, up to 10 GHz, and the field levels exceed the typical civil protection levels. The classification is based on the band ratio defined as br
where th is the upper frequency point and tithe lower frequency point. The frequency points are defined such that 90% of the signal energy is contained within these frequency points. The frequency bandwidth classification adopted from [20] is presented in Table 3 .
As an example, in [21] an overview is given of narrowband sources and in [22] an overview is given of wideband sources.
Three different waveforms can be distinguished that are common for HPEM; a narrowband waveform, an ultrawideband (UWB) waveform, and a damped sinusoidal waveform. Most waveforms are similar to these waveforms or are a combination of them.
A narrowband waveform can emit a high amplitude burst of pulses at a carrier frequency, with each pulse containing many cycles, at a certain PRF, or a continuous signal. The majority of its energy is centred around a single frequency, i.e., the carrier frequency. The carrier frequency can be tuned to a vulnerable frequency of the intended target to increase the chance of a successful attack, but this implies that the vulnerable frequencies need to be known a priori. In the case of wireless communication this can easily be determined, and the front door coupling can be maximized with a narrowband source tuned to the operating frequency of the com munication system.
An UWB waveform is represented by a double exponential pulse with very low rise time and low full-width-at-half-maximum (FWHM) time. As opposed to the narrowband waveform, this waveform spreads its energy over a very wide frequency band, Hyperband resulting in a relatively low power density. Since a UWB covers a large frequency band, it is likely to cover a vulnerable frequency of the victim system. However, as mentioned, the power density is relatively low, and the energy of a UWB pulse is very low because it is extremely short. This makes it less likely to cause damage to a system.
A damped sinusoidal waveform is a combination of the previous two waveforms. It has the short rise time of a UWB pulse and a carrier frequency carrying a large part of the energy. In Figure 2 the differences between the time and frequency content of the waveforms is emphasized.
As explained in [23] , to analyse the risk an RF source poses it is necessary to not only take technical attributes into account, but also non-technical attributes. The risk of a source is also depen dent on the likelihood of occurrence of an RF source attack. For this reason we also classify RF sources by the following non-tech nical attributes:
• Source Technology: Different sources can be classified by their technical sophistication level in assembling and deploying such systems. We divide the levels as described in [6] into;
low-tech, medium-tech, and high-tech generator systems.
• Portability: The portability of the sources is divided into four different levels as described in [24] ; pocket-sized, briefcase sized, motor-vehicle sized, and trailer sized.
• Availability: Measure of both cost and the technological sophistication as described in [24] . Four different levels are classified ranging from 1 to 4, where 4 means that the availabil ity is low.
In 
Critical Infrastructures Analysis, From an IEMI

Point of View
Critical infrastructures can be classified in many ways but typical ly include [25] :
• Utilities: Including power generation, electricity, oil and gas distribution and water supply.
• Te lecommunications.
• Information technology systems.
• Industrial production, including food production.
• Transportation systems: Road, rail, sea and air borne transport.
• Emergency and government services: Including law enforce ment, fire and public health services.
These infrastructures are highly distributed, very complex and also highly interdependent at many levels. Rinaldi et al. demonstrate these interdependencies and give an indication of the difficulties involved in assessing the propagation of widespread simultaneous failures in dif ferent parts each infrastructure through the chains of interdependen cies to give a complete picture of the risk posed to society by a large scale IEMI attack [26] . Even for small-scale localized IEMI attacks using less sophisticated sources it is clear that there are key points in the interdependencies where significant widespread disruption could be caused. Whilst outside of the scope of the STRUCTURES project it is worth noting that the operational characteristics of critical infra structures are often key to determining the impact of any IEMI attack.
For example, the availability and lead-time of replacement specialist electronic components could significantly hinder the restoration of services if contingency planning has not considered the risks of a widespread intentional lEMI attack.
There is a lot of commonality in these infrastructures with tele communications and IT increasingly providing the essential means of control, monitoring and management of the large distributed networks of equipment that constitute a critical infrastructure.
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) equipment is widely used for communication of data and control signals
A number of changes in the structure and management of critical infra structures are currently occurring which affect their overall susceptibil ity to IEMI attacks. In certain regions and for certain infrastructures there is an increasing centralisation of the control functions into a small number of national control centres. This could allow greater security to be afforded to the equipment inside but also concentrates the key con trol processes for wide areas into a small number of potential targets.
"Smart Grid" and similar technologies are also beginning to be imple mented in utility infrastructures [27] . The increased localisation of con trol and supply this enables could improve the resilience of the service;
however, such technologies usually make use of low cost sensors, antennas and telecommunications components that are vulnerable to IEMI attack. The use of wireless technologies in particular potentially allows low-power front-door "jamming" attacks to be perpetrated with very low cost, highly mobile IEMI sources.
The electronic equipment used in most critical infrastructures is not especially hardened against IEMI. Much of the IT equipment is commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and the immunity stan dards applied are usually civilian EMC standards with test levels far below those than can be generated by even the least sophisti • Accessibility: The ease with which a source can be introduced into a location where it can be effective. For conducted sources this could involve gaining access to secured areas or buildings, while for radiated sources a location far outside the bounds of the facility may still allow an attack to be perpetrated. This is complementary to the mobility characteristic of the IEMI source discussed above.
• Susceptibility: The overall susceptibility of a facility to IEMI is a complex combination of the susceptibility of pieces of equip ment, transfer functions from the source to each piece of equip ment and other aspects such as redundancy of critical systems [28] . The susceptibility of equipment can be classified according to whether the effect is transitory, requires systems to be reset or causes permanent physical damage necessitating the replacement of components.
• Consequence: The consequence of an IEMI attack is very dependent on operational features of the facility and has to be determined by a detailed analysis that extends far beyond elec tromagnetic considerations.
between local service installations and control centres. At the low The STRUCTURES project is mainly concerned with methods for level there is also great diversity, especially across the EU, in the the determination of infrastructure susceptibility and providing specific details and implementations of infrastructures. mitigation techniques for its reduction. 
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External Respons e of System to HPEM The need to address the compatibility of facilities against IEMI threats [8] has led to the trend of providing more efficient modelling strategies for analysing the response of large complex systems such as aero planes [34] , [35] , cars [36] , [37] . or helicopters [38] ; and critical facili ties such as electrified railway facilities [39] , and electric power infra structures [40] , [41] . The main issues that arise when considering the ©2014 IEEE Electromagnetic Compatibility Magazine -Volume 3 -Quarter 4
analysis of large complex systems are the large amount of required computational resources for handling such simulations, and the pos sibility of including the physical models of the generally neglected (materials, junctions, slots) components that are required to obtain accurate descriptions of current distributions [38] .
A. Electromagnetic Topology
To perform approximate analyses of the response of complex sys tems, electromagnetic topology (EMT) [42] appears to be a very use ful tool since it allows subdividing a complicated chain of EM inter action events into a number of simpler parts. Within an EMT-based analysis, the response of a system is obtained by considering inde pendently all the interaction problems that occur, starting from the knowledge of the incident field and ending with the internal compo nent response [30] . To illustrate the concept of EM topology, Figure 3 presents the EMT of a civilian building subjected to the radiated IEMI generated by a HPEM source hidden in a suitcase. In the EMT Figure 4 adapted from [33] ). In many practical cases, the largest contribution to a response within the system is due to transmission lines, which provide a direct propagation path from one point to another. Thus, the analysis could be carried out by only evaluating the contribution of direct connections to the volume under test.
c. Simulation Techniques at Low or Intermediate Frequencies
At low or intermediate frequencies, three different types of fully validated numerical tools can be used to solve the coupling prob lem [38] at each shielding level: between DC to about 1 GHz (the upper frequency limit depends on the cross section of commonly found cables) [38] .
The MTL model sources stressing the network are described as a set of voltage and/or current generators distributed along the wires length and calculated from the incident electromagnetic fields. This is how the link between 3D full-wave codes and cable network codes is made. The largest advantage of such an approach is that the calculation of the incident fields, which takes time whatever the full wave technique is used, is made once for all in the absence of the cable bundles. Then, the MTL solution can be launched for various cable topologies, provided that the cable routes remain the same [34] , [35] .
Another important advantage of MTL models is that they can be used with an EMT formalism [43] in which the wiring network is decomposed as a set of tubes and junctions, respectively, repre senting the network branches and nodes. Currents on the branch es are obtained from the frequency domain solution of the so called Baum-Liu-Tesche (BLT) equations describing all the interac tions to the network [34] . The junctions are described in terms of any type of Z, Y, or S matrices derived from the electric circuits modelling the wire connections or loads, or from measurements.
When dealing with shielded cables, the coupling between the external currents flowing on the cable screens and the internal induced voltages and currents is made through the so-called transfer impedance and admittance of the screens [321, [44] . The theoretical estimation and measurement of the transfer imped ance of common cables at frequencies beyond hundreds of MHz become an issue, and poses a difficulty for implementing the MTL models. It is important to highlight that MTL models do not account for radiation and are based on a quasi-TEM field response the transmission lines. Such a condition is generally observed when the MTL height over the reference plane does not exceed a frac tion of the minimum wavelength (one tenth or so) (one tenth or so) [30] , [45] . Depending on the frequency regime, it may be desired to account for the backscattering of cables in order to identify reso nant behaviours in the cavities containing the wires. However, as far as the TEM mode approximation is concerned, techniques are available to handle the field emission due to cable-network induced currents with 3D codes or reciprocity-based approaches [32] , [38] .
Recent efforts to extend the cable models at higher frequencies have provided methods to generalize the MTL models to account for high frequency and radiation effects (e.g., [45] , [46] ).
3) Electric al circuit codes: Electrical circuit codes such as SPICE are used to solve the equipment response once the currents and voltages at the cable terminations (equipment inputs) are deter mined. The calculations are generally limited to the input of the equipment, and no internal electronic components or PCBs are taken into account [38] . [38] . Since the design and the placement of compo nents in complex systems at high frequencies are not well con trolled, statistical models appear to be more appropriate for obtaining the response of the system subject to random input parameters [47] . A commonly used approach to such a problem has been for years the well-known Monte-Carlo technique which requires a large number of deterministic simulations to obtain the probability density function (PDF) of the output of the system [48] .
O. Simulation Techniques at High Frequencies
In the kind of models required for IEMI studies, where a single deterministic simulation is a major computational task, the pre ferred approach should allow to establish the PDF, or at least some of its moments, from a small number of simulations. Methods like the Unscented Transform [47] or the Stochastic Collocation method [49] among others, have recently been suggested to be accurate and faster than the Monte-Carlo approach. However, their capacities in terms of modelling real system configurations have yet to be demonstrated.
In the context of IEMI, a statistical approach provides estimates of mean coupling but it does not provide any "worst case" scenario.
The definition of the worst case being unclear in the scientific community, this approach can be considered as useful since no deterministic method is currently available to perform such an analysis [47] . The definition of appropriate norms in terms of statis tical quantities, as is done for EMT, should allow overcoming this drawback [35] .
2) Th e Po wer Balance (PWB) Method: The PWB method [50, 51] [38] . A BLT-like equation can also be derived to solve for the power densities and dissipated powers at each node and as a consequence, the PWB method can also be described with an EMT formalism [53].
Summary
The European STRUCTURES project aims at investigating the issue of Intentional Electromagnetic interference to the services and infrastructures our lifestyle is based on. This study has a number of critical aspects, mainly related to the large size of the problem (both in terms of electrical dimensions and in terms of parameters and cases to be accounted for) and the complexity of the intercon nections among the many parts. We briefly reviewed some topics 
